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Eminent domain was the most often litigated topic in the area of
property during the past survey year. Despite this fact, there were no
drastic modifications of prior case law and most of the cases either
restated prior holdings or involved logical expansion of previous hold-
ings.
The much-publicized case of Timmon's v. South Carolina Tricen-
tennial Commission' actually included two cases: first, an action
brought by the Tricentennial Commission against Mrs. Timmons to
acquire a parcel of her real estate through the power of eminent domain
and, secondly, an action brought by Mrs. Timmons seeking to enjoin
the Commission from acquiring her property. The former action will
hereinafter be referred to as the condemnation proceeding and the latter
the injunctive proceeding. .Mrs. Timmons prevailed in the condemna-
tion proceeding, getting a money judgment for the property, but lost
the injunctive proceeding and, however, appealed both decisions. Both
decisions were affirmed by the supreme court and only the injunctive
proceeding will be discussed herein as the condemnation decision was
appealed only on procedural grounds.
The supreme court determined that the issues raised by Mrs. Tim-
mons had been correctly set forth and disposed of below and adopted
part of the order of Judge Grimball as the opinion of the court. In
disposing of the objection that there was no necessity for the condemna-
tion, the court relied upon a prior case2 and stated:
In the law of eminent domain, it is well established that there must
be a necessity for the taking but this does not mean an absolute
necessity, but rather a reasonable necessity. 3
Mrs. Timmons' objection that the taking was not a permanent
taking was rejected even though the Commission will expire in 1972
because the property will remain vested in the State of South Carolina
and will continue to be used for park purposes. The court in finding
that the taking was for a "public use" cited several South Carolina
cases which had held that the term "public use" must be flexible and
keep abreast of the changing social conditions.' Further, it was noted
1. 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970).
2. Seabrook v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 159 S.C. 1, 156 S.E. 1 (1930).
3. Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 388, 175
S,E.2d 805, 810 (1970).
4. Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940); Riley v. Charles-
ton Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485 (1904).
1
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that the uses for which this property was being taken had previously
been recognized as a "public use" in Mims v. McNair,' a case involv-
ing a bond issue with which the Timmons property in part was being
purchased. In finding that Mrs. Timmons had not been denied due
process and that the statute under which the condemnation took place
was valid and clear in its delegation of power, the court found occasion
to say "that the legislature can delegate the power of eminent domain
to subsidiary agencies is settled.
' 6
In South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Kaiser7 the court held
that there was a valid necessity for condemnation of land by the State
Ports Authority, where there existed a common wall between a building
of the Ports Authorty and a building of the appellant, because the
appellant's proposed demolition of her building would require the
Ports Authority to provide protection and support of its building at
prohibitive expense. Relying upon Sease v. City of SpartanburgA which
held that the supreme court will not review an agency's decision regard-
ing necessity unless there is a showing of fraud, bad faith, or clear abuse
of discretion, the court said the fact that the Ports Authority had no
firm or definite plans for the future use of the property was insufficient
to show bad faith or abuse of discretion. The case was reversed, how-
ever, as the trial judge's granting of a jury trial at the insistence of the
plaintiff-Ports Authority was determined to be erroneous. The court
ruled that section 25-111 of the South Carolina Code, allows objections
and/or demands to be made only by a party "in and by a return," that
section 25-126 of the South Carolina Code allows a demand for jury
trial to be made only by "any person having an interest in or lien upon
the property," and further that each of these sections must be read in
conjunction with the other. As the Ports Authority could not have
made a return to its own notice and had no interest in the property
prior to the condemnation, the granting of a jury trial was erroneous
and required reversal in part.
The overzealous argument of counsel for the condemnee in a land
condemnation case caused a judgment to be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial in South Carolina Highway Department v.
Nasim,9 even though no objection was interposed by the opposing
5. 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969).
6. 254 S.C. at 403, 175 S.E.2d at 817.
7. 254 S.C. 600, 176 S.E.2d 532 (1970).
8. 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963).
9. 255 S.C. 406, 179 S.E.2d 211 (1971).
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counsel. Counsel's abuse of a Highway Department witness, compar-
ing him to the Nazi sympathizers during World War II among other
things, was so objectionable that it tended to greatly prejudice the
Highway Department's case in the eyes of the jury. The court quoted
the following general rule as previously set forth in Johnson v. Charles-
ton & Western Carolina Railway:10
It has been settled by many decisions of this court that, except in
flagrant cases and where prejudice clearly appears, objection to
improper argument of counsel should be made then and there, and
comes too late if not made until after the verdict has been ren-
dered."
The court said that it adhered to the rule and reversed this case because
counsel's argument fell squarely within the exception.
Galbraith v. City of Spartanburg'12 was an action by condemnees
to recover for losses which allegedly resulted from the premature settle-
ment of a condemnation by the City of Spartanburg. The plaintiffs
appealed to the supreme court after demurrers to both of the plaintiffs'
causes of action were sustained by the lower court. In the original
action the issue of necessity had not been raised and the only issue was
the question of value. After a jury had been drawn and empaneled, a
settlement agreement was reached and a decree was entered in accor-
dance with the agreement. Judge Baker stated:
A litigant is barred from raising any issues which were adjudicated
in the former suit and any issues which might have been raised in
the former action. Any question of necessity could have been de-
termined in the original action. 3
He further said that the prior settlement had the effect of judgment,
could not be attacked collaterally, and could be opened only by a
showing of fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The adequacy of damages
awarded was not reopened, even though the plaintiffs argued for addi-
tional damages due to a lease cancellation, as all damages of any kind
whatsoever should have been taken into account in determining the fair
market value of the property and were considerations which were deter-
mined in the prior settlement. However, the supreme court did overrule
the demurrer to the second cause of action and said there had been an
10. 234 S.C. 448, 108 S.E.2d 777 (1959).
I1. Id. at 467, 108 S.E.2d at 786.
12. 255 S.C. 380, 179 S.E.2d 37 (1971).
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unreasonable delay in demolition which had deprived plaintiffs of the
beneficial use of their property. The court found that the condemnor
was obliged to demolish the building located on plaintiffs' land and
that a cause of action was stated for failure to demolish within a
reasonable length of time.
Hensley v. Riverland Development Corp." was an action for dam-
ages for the alleged obstruction of a right-of-way. A demurrer to the
plaintiffs' cause of action was sustained for insufficiency of facts to
state a cause of action. The plaintiffs' land was surrounded by the
defendant's land over which the plaintiffs have a right-of-way easement
for an access road. The defendant-corporation granted a right-of-way
easement to the South Carolina Highway Department which covered
part of the common ground to the plaintiffs' easement. As a result of
the Highway Department's construction of a road over the right-of-
way, the plaintiffs alleged damage to their easement. The court found
that the damages were caused by the encroachment of a highway con-
structed by the South Carolina Highway Department in performing its
public duties, that the Highway Department had the right and duty to
acquire the right-of-way by grant or eminent domain, that the defen-
dant committed no wrong by granting the right-of-way, and that the
plaintiffs should have their remedy, if any, against the Highway De-
partment. If the road construction constituted a taking of the plaintiffs'
property, they were entitled to just compensation as provided for in the
South Carolina Constitution.15
II. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF REAL PROPERTY
A. Zoning-Permitted Uses
City of Myrtle Beach v. Mayer 6 involved an action brought by
the City of Myrtle Beach to enjoin the defendants from operating a
children's dancing school in their home in an allged violation of the
zoning laws of the city. The applicable section of the zoning ordinance
in question permitted the following uses within the residential district
in which the defendants reside: "(2) Public schools, elementary, high
and education institutions having a curriculum the same as ordinarily
14. 182 S.E.2d 290 (S.C. 1971).
15. Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842
(1931).
16. 181 S.E.2d 265 (S.C. 1971).
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given in public schools."' 7 The defendants argued that their dancing
school was a permitted use within the exception allowing an educa-
tional institution "having a curriculum the same as ordinarily given in
public schools." Further the defendants contended that "the meaning
of the word curriculum does not necessarily comprehend the whole
body of instruction at a school, but may signify a particular course of
instruction in a single discipline."' 8 While conceding that the defen-
dant's school was an educational institution which had a curriculum,
the municipality urged that the curriculum was not "the same as ordi-
narily given in public schools." The circuit court, in rejecting the rec-
ommendation of the master in equity, found the dancing school was not
a permitted use and issued an injunction. In affirming the decision of
the lower court, the supreme court noted that, while descriptive terms
in zoning ordinances are to be liberally construed in favor of the land-
owner, saying that the defendants' school and the public schools of
Myrtle Beach both teach dancing is far short of saying that, even as
to this one discipline, their curricula are the same.
B. Restrictive Covenants
Easterly v. Hall9 was concerned with the enforcement of restric-
tive covenants on residential property. The plaintiffs brought an action
to restrain and enjoin the defendant, Hall, from constructing a duplex
apartment on his property, allegedly in violation of restrictions and
protective covenants applicable to his property. A brief summary of the
chain of title is necessary to understand this case. Caro C. Powell had
acquired title to a forty-nine acre tract of land near Spartanburg in
1935. The property was later bisected by a dual lane highway. The
northern sector was subdivided, a plat recorded and all lots conveyed
by deeds which contained the following restriction: "That only one
residence may be erected on any one lot, but any person may use two
or more lots placing one residence thereon."" Property south of the
highway was conveyed by four deeds which contained the restriction
set forth above and the balance of the tract was conveyed to Woodrow
W. Willard by a deed containing no restrictions whatsoever. Shortly
after being granted the property, Willard subdivided his land into four-
17. Myrtle Beach, S.C., Zoning Ordinances § 32-6 (2).
18. 181 S.E.2d 265, 265-66 (S.C. 1971).
19. 182S.E.2d 671 (S.C. 1971).
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teen lots and imposd, by a separate instrument, strict protective coven-
ants upon all these lots. One restriction stated: "No apartment house
or duplex of any type shall be erected or maintained on any of these
lots . . . ." All lot owners whose property was located south of the
highway, including the defendant Hall, joined in and were signatories
to this instrument which in part said that the owners of land south of
the highway:
Desire to provide protective covenants, restrictions and easements
for the resubdivision of the Caro C. Powell property as shown on
said plat for Woodrow W. Willard, and desire that the same shall
be developed and used exclusively for private residential purpos-
es. 2
1
It is also necessary to note that all the plaintiffs, except one, had
obtained their property through Mr. Willard, and, therefore, had the
deed from Caro C. Powell to Woodrow W. Willard, containing no
restrictions, in their chain of title.
The court stated:
[A]s we view the record the question for determination is whether
the restrictions contained in the deeds from Caro C. Powell to the
appellant and others are valid and enforceable by the respon-
dents.Y
It was found that Caro C. Powell had manifested a definite scheme for
the development of the property. The court also stressed the point that
the trial judge had found that Willard had promised Powell to restrict
the property to residential use for the protection of those who had
previously purchased lots south of the highway even though there were
no restrictions in the deed from Powell to Willard. Prior South Caro-
lina cases have held that the general scheme of subdivision development
is binding and enforceable among all the landowners as there is mutual-
ity of covenant and consideration and that each landowner has an
interest in the negative equitable easements thereby created .2 Chief
Justice Moss further said:
This court has held that restrictive covenants imposed upon
some lots, but not upon others, in the same subdivision were en-
forceable among all where it was clear from the inception of the
21. Id. at 673.
22. Id.
23. See Williams v. Cone, 249 S.C. 374, 154 S.E.2d 682 (1967); Edwards v. Surratt,
228 S.C. 512, 90 S.E.2d 906 (1956).
[Vol. 23
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subdivision that there had been a general plan for its residential
development and such plan had been adhered to without material
departure therefrom, and it has been understood and relied upon
by those concerned. 2
The appellant's attempt to have the restrictions declared invalid
and unenforceable under the rule announced in Stylecraft v. Thomas,21
that "where the granting clause in a deed purports to convey title in
fee simple absolute, the estate may not be cut down by subsequent
words in the same instrument."26 The court found that the language
restricting the property to single family residences was a restriction and
not a condition subsequent that would attempt to reduce the estate to
a fee simple determinable.Y7 The "right of entry"8 was an additional
way in which the grantor could enforce violations of the restrictive
covenants and in no way diminished the rights accruing to the other
grantees in the subdivision.
The court concluded that the trial judge had correctly found that
the subdivision had been developed with a common scheme and that
the several lot owners had the right to the enforcement of the restric-
tions contained in the several deeds. Interestingly enough, even though
the plaintiffs prevailed, by stipulation the defendant was allowed to
complete the construction of his duplex but was permanently enjoined
from using the structure for more than one family.
I11. DEEDS -CAPACITY OF GRANTOR
In Vereen v. Bell, 29 an action to rescind and cancel a deed on the
grounds of mental incapacity of the grantor, the supreme court fol-
lowed the criteria previously set forth for determining the mental ca-
pacity of the grantor in a deed" by stating:
24. Easterly v. Hall, 182 S.E.2d 671, 674 (S.C. 1971) quoting Pitts v. Brown, 215
S.C. 122, 54 S.E.2d 538 (1949).
25. 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E.2d 46 (1968).
26. Id. at 498, 159 S.E.2d at 47.
27. 182 S.E.2d at 674. The first restriction violated the rule announced in Stylecraft
and was declared void. Restrictions two through seven were upheld.
28. 182 S.E.2d at 675. The "right of entry" was not a right to terminate the estate,
but only a right to enter and abate the violation of the restriction.
29. 182 S.E.2d 296 (S.C. 1971).
30. See, e.g., Mathias v. Mathias, 206 S.C. 276, 33 S.E.2d 626 (1945); Cathcart v.
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Mere infirmity of mind or body, not amounting to incapacity to
understand the nature of the act, is insufficient to render a deed
void. A person with sufficient mental capacity to comprehend
what he is doing and to understand the nature of the act and its
consequences has the capacity to make a deed. 3'
The court further noted that, while the action should have been brought
in equity rather than as an action at law, a ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict was tantamount to a finding of fact by a judge sitting
in equity and hence the supreme court had the power to rule on the
judgment below. Finding the preponderance of the evidence against the
appellant Vereen, the court affirmed the lower court judgment in favor
of the defendant.
IV. PARTITION OF REAL PROPERTY
Smith v. Hawkins 2 was a partition proceeding in which the appel-
lants-defendants appealed to the supreme court on six exceptions.
Simpson Hawkins had died intestate in 1931 survived by his widow,
Ida Hawkins, and four children. Shortly thereafter Ida Hawkins con-
veyed her undivided one-third interest to her son, Asa Hawkins, who
in turn' reconveyed to his mother a life estate in and to all of his
undivided interest in the land. The first exception was that the deeds
between Ida Hawkins and Asa Hawkins were witnessed by disqualified
parties, that the probate was not signed before a notary public and that
the deed from Ida Hawkins to her son was without sufficient considera-
tion. This exception was overruled because a deed improperly witnessed
and probated is still good between the parties.3" The stated considera-
tion, the assumption of a mortgage, was found to be sufficient. As to
the second exception, the court said that the allowance of attorney's
fees in partition proceedings was within the discretion of the trial judge
and there was no error in denying attorney's fees unless there was a
showing of abuse of discretion.
The third and fourth exceptions were held to have been waived by
the failure to act promptly and to raise the objections in a proper
manner. The appellants raised their fifth exception based on Circuit
Court Rule 54, which provides, in part:
31. 182 S.E.2d 296, 297 (S.C. 1971).
32. 254 S.C. 423, 175 S.E.2d 824 (1970).
33. Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Fudge, 113 S.C. 25, 100 S.E. 628 (1919).
[Vol. 23
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No partition of real estate of a deceased person shall be had unless
the legal representative or representatives of such deceased person
be made parties to the action . . . or that the personal estate in
the hands of the representative or representatives is sufficient for
the payment of the debts of such deceased person, or unless in the
decree due provision is made for the payment of debts.'
As the record showed that approximately forty years had passed since
the death of Simpson Hawkins, and any rights of his creditors had long
since expired, the court held that the administrator of his estate was
not a necessary party. Neither was the administrator of Ida Hawkins,
who died in 1967, a necessary party since no claims against her estate
were chargeable to the land which she had conveyed in 1931 and in
which she had only a life estate at the time of her death. The final
objection was that Ida Hawkins had acquired title to the land by
adverse possession by virtue of having lived on the land for thirty-five
years prior to her death. Without citing authority, the court said that
there must be an assertion, or notice of a claim, adverse to that of the
owners of the fee to sustain a claim of adverse possession by a life
tenant and there was no such notice or assertion in this case.
V. FRAUD
There were two cases, one brought by a grantor and the other
brought by a grantee, in March 1971 which involved issues of fraud in
real property transactions. While neither case has been finally settled,
the rulings on both cases would seem to merit comment. In Lawson v.
Citizens and Southern National Bank of South Carolina,3 the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed a circuit court ruling which sustained
the defendant's demurrer. Plaintiff Lawson had purchased'from the
Citizens and Southern National Bank, as trustee, a lot allegedly filled
with unsuitable material which was concealed by a covering of soil, and
had later built a house upon this lot. After conveying this property to
his wife in a divorce proceeding, Lawson and his ex-wife brought an
action against the developer for actual and punitive damages for fraud-
ulent concealment of subsurface defects in the land. In reversing the
lower court ruling, the court said that Lawson's cause of action ripened
upon completion of his dwelling and that the defendant's liability was
not erased by Lawson's subsequent conveyance. The final settlement
34. Rules of Practice for the Circuit Courts of South Carolina, No. 54.
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of this case should be noteworthy as there is no precedent in South
Carolina case law involving non-disclosure of an artificially created
and concealed unstable condition of land.
Ayers v. Ackerman36 was an action by a fee holder to have an
allegedly fraudulently obtained lease rescinded and declared invalid.
The lease had been given by the plaintiff's mother prior to her convey-
ance to her son. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, Judge Hemphill cited
Lawson"7 and said that one in the position of the plaintiff's mother
could maintain an action for damages after conveying the property to
a third person, and was also a necessary party to the action under Rule
19, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The order in this case was mainly
concerned with procedural matters of no particular significance to
property law.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
State v. Hanapole3s involved an interpretation of the South Caro-
lina trespass statute.39 The supreme court relied upon a 1961 decision4"
in which the court had stated that the act "is clearly for the purpose
of protecting the rights of the owners or those in control of private
property."'" In overturning the trespass convictions of the defendants
the court found that the airport premises are owned by the Richland-
Lexington Airport District,42 a political subdivision of South Carolina,
and are, therefore, public property. As the purpose of the statute is to
protect the rights on "private" property and the airport is "public"
property, a conviction based on section 16-388 could not stand.
36. 324 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1971).
37. 180 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1971).
38. 255 S.C. 258, 178 S.E.2d 247 (1970).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-388 (1962). Any person who, without legal cause or good
excuse, enters into the dwelling house, place of business or on the premises of another
person after having been warned within six months preceding not to do so or any person
who, having entered into the dwelling house, place of business or on the premises of
another person without having been warned within six months not to do so, fails and
refuses, without good cause or good excuse, to leave immediately upon being ordered or
requested to do so by the person in possession or his agent or representative shall, on
conviction, be fined not more than one hundred dollars or be imprisoned for not more
than thirty days.
40. City of Greenville v. Peterson, 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826 (1961).
41. Id. at 303, 122 S.E.2d at 828.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-390.13 (1962).
[Vol. 23
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In Sadler v. Lyle" a taxpayers' suit challenging a bond issue in
the City of Rock Hill, the appellant contended that the amendment
under which the bond issue was approved had not been properly sub-
mitted to the people for approval; and, secondly, that the proposed use
of the funds did not come within the scope of the language of the special
constitutional amendment which removed the debt limitation for bonds
whose proceeds are used for "purchase, erection, improvement and
maintenance of streets and sidewalks." After disposing of the appel-
lant's first argument on Constitutional grounds, the court addressed
itself to the second argument which concerned the fact that the project
included several items such as relocation of railroad tracks, the con-
struction of railroad buildings, the construction of overhead bridges
and underpasses and off-street parking. Noting several prior cases in
which constitutional amendments relaxing the debt limitations had
been given a broad interpretation in order to effect the legislative in-
tent," the court found that, even though each specific item did not in
and of itself constitute a street improvement, the proposed uses were
necessary parts of the overall street improvement program and hence
within the scope of the amendment.
M. K. FARMER
43. 254 S.C. 535, 176 S.E.2d 290 (1970).
44. Knight v. Allen, 234 S.C. 559, 109 S.E. 817 (1959); Bruce v. City of Greenville,




Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
